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Abstract
In a standard New-Keynesian sticky-price model of monetary policy-
making, we show that formulating the policy objective of a monetary
union in terms of a weighted average of objectives for inflation and out-
put in each of the member countries, instead of union-wide aggregate
inflation and output, can have an important impact on the effective
weight each member country carries in policymaking. This has impli-
cations for how fluctuation costs are distributed among member coun-
tries, and whether or not monetary policy contributes to harmonize
inflation and output across the union.
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Introduction
It is widely recognized that monetary policy in a monetary union cannot
respond to the individual needs of each member country as well as outside
a union. It is also well known that the welfare costs that arise because of
this can be quite different for the member countries, depending on how het-
erogeneous they are, and the weight each carries in policymaking. However,
an issue that has not received much attention is that the distribution of
these costs across the member countries can depend on how one aggregates
across these. In particular, the present study explores the implications of
the union’s policy objective being formulated in terms of union-wide aggre-
gates, instead of as a weighted average of objectives for inflation and output
in each of the member countries. We show that this choice can impact the
effective weight each union member carries in policymaking, even when the
two methods do not differ in terms of the weights officially assigned to each
country.
We employ a simple New-Keynesian sticky-price model, of the type com-
monly used for analyzing monetary policy, both in the literature and at
central banks, see for example Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999 and 2001),
McCallum and Nelson (2000) and Woodford (1999a, 1999b and 2000), to
show that countries with a high degree of openness will have a larger im-
pact on policy when the union’s policy objective is formulated in terms of
a weighted average of country-level objectives for inflation and output, in-
stead of an objective in terms of union-wide aggregate inflation and output.
While our model is too simple to capture all the channels through which
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shocks are transmitted between countries, or to realistically study the exact
distribution of fluctuation costs, its simplicity allows for an easy demonstra-
tion of our general point, that how one aggregates across union members
affects the effective weight each carries in policymaking. The reason is that
the policy objective is a quadratic function, so it makes a difference whether
one aggregates across union members before or after inserting into it.
The official objective of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to keep
the weighted average of the harmonized indices of consumer prices (HICP)
of the member countries growing below two percent per year, where the
weights correspond to each country’s share of total consumption in the union
(Svensson (1999)). This is an objective in terms of a union aggregate that
according to our analysis could be assigning too little weight to union coun-
tries with a high degree of openness. Instead, we propose that the policy
objective should be to keep inflation in each of the union countries below
a certain rate each year, with the importance of obtaining the goal in each
of the countries being determined by their relative size. This would force
policymakers to pay more attention to the needs of small countries that dif-
fer significantly from the union average in terms of how their inflation and
output behaves, more so the more they differ from the average. Because
of this, policy would contribute to reduce the dispersion across union coun-
tries. In addition, it would yield a more equitable distribution of the welfare
costs that arise from monetary policy having to be identical in all member
countries.
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Model
Our argument can be illustrated in a sticky-price model with J countries or
regions. Assume that the economies of each of the countries are governed
by the aggregate supply and demand equations,
pij,t = βjEtpij,t+1 + λjyj,t + uj,t, j = 1, ..., J (1)
yj,t = −ϕj (Rt − Etpij,t+1) + Etyj,t+1 + nj,t, j = 1, ..., J (2)
respectively, where pij,t is the inflation rate in country j at time t, Etpij,t+1
is the one-period-ahead forecast of inflation in country j at time t, yj,t is the
output in country j at time t and Etyj,t+1 is the one-period-ahead forecast of
output in country j at time t.1 Rt is the nominal interest rate, which is the
same across all the J union members. All variables are in terms of deviations
from their flexible-price values. The shocks uj,t and nj,t, which may be auto-
correlated, and also correlated across countries, make inflation, output and
the interest rate deviate from their flexible-price values. The policy problem
is to mitigate these deviations. The parameters of the model, βj , λj and
ϕj , are permitted to differ across countries. The discount factor βj ∈ (0, 1)
governs how expected future inflation affects present inflation. The degree
to which there exists an inflation-output trade-off in the Phillips curve (1)
depends on λj > 0, while ϕj > 0 determines the impact the expected real
interest rate has on output. The equations are derived from fundamentals as-
1Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on the information available at time
t, which we assume includes all the parameter values and all the variables that have been
realized at that time.
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suming optimizing agents and menu costs, see Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo
(1983) for the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (1), and Woodford (1995) and
McCallum and Nelson (1999) for the dynamic IS-curve (2).
Contrary to the model studied by Benigno (2004), our framework does
not explicitly include trade between countries. According to Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2001) this is a valid simplification because terms of trade de-
viations from flexible-price values will be proportional to output’s deviation
from flexible-price output. The model for an open economy is therefore
identical to that of a closed one, except for the values of the parameters λj
and ϕj , since the terms of trade enter through the output variable, affecting
the related parameters.
Union Policy Objective
From an economic perspective, the objective of the union’s monetary policy
should be to maximize the welfare of the union members. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) show that in an economy j, this is achieved at any time
t = 0 by minimizing the loss function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtj
(
pi2j,t + αjy
2
j,t + θjR
2
j,t
)
(3)
with respect to Rj,0, since this will minimize the welfare costs of the distor-
tions that arise due to price-stickiness. The coefficients αj and θj are both
positive and measure the aversion towards output and interest rate volatility,
respectively. These are, as is discussed by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001),
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sensitive to, among other things, the degree of openness of the economy, and
can therefore differ across countries (see discussion below). Since there is
no way for the monetary authority to credibly commit to a plan for future
policy, we focus on discretionary policy.
A direct application of the above loss function (3) to the union as a
whole, implies that the policy objective should be to minimize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
pi2t + αy
2
t + θR
2
t
)
(4)
with respect to R0, where β, α and θ are union-wide values, and
pit =
J∑
j=1
pjpij,t (5)
yt =
J∑
j=1
pjyj,t (6)
are union aggregate inflation and output, respectively, and pj denotes the
relative size of country j for j = 1,..., J , where
J∑
j=1
pj = 1.
2 Substituting
into the loss function above (4) yields
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
( J∑
j=1
pjpij,t
)2
+ α
(
J∑
j=1
pjyj,t
)2
+ θR2t
 (7)
as the union-wide loss function.
The objective in terms of union aggregates (7) represents the welfare
2Output is measured in terms of deviations from flexible-price values, so union-wide
output can be obtained by computing the weighted average of the country level values,
just as inflation. For simplicity we assume that the same weights are used to aggregate
inflation and output.
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costs of fluctuations to the average union consumer. An alternative is to
take a weighted average of the welfare of the representative consumer in
each member country. When the weight assigned to country j is given by
pj , the objective would then be to minimize
E0
∞∑
t=0
J∑
j=1
pjβ
t
j
(
pi2j,t + αjy
2
j,t + θjR
2
t
)
(8)
with respect to R0, assuming consumers are only directly affected by infla-
tion and output in their own country.
The policy objective in terms of union aggregates (7) is invariant to a
mean-preserving spread of inflation and output across member countries,
since it would by definition leave aggregate inflation and output unchanged.
However, because the objective in terms of average country-level welfare
(8) is a weighted sum of the squared values of inflation and output in each
country, a mean-preserving spread would raise its value. Hence, an objective
in terms of union aggregates provides no incentives to conduct monetary
policy so as to contribute toward reducing disparities in inflation and output
across union members, while an objective in terms of the average of country-
level welfare does.
Union Policy
The optimal discretionary policy when the objective is in terms of union
aggregates (7) can, as is shown by Currie and Levine (1993), Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (1999), Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Woodford (1999a),
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be found by minimizing the Lagrangian
£A =
∞∑
t=0
βt
( J∑
j=1
pjpij,t
)2
+ α
(
J∑
j=1
pjyj,t
)2
+ θR2t

−
∞∑
t=0
J∑
j=1
κj,t
(
βjEtpij,t+1 + λjyj,t + uj,t − pij,t
)
(9)
−
∞∑
t=0
J∑
j=1
υj,t
(−ϕj (Rt − Etpij,t+1) + Etyj,t+1 + nj,t − yj,t)
with respect to pii,0, yi,0 and R0, for i = 1,..., J . Here, κj,t and υj,t are
Lagrangian multipliers associated with constraints (1) and (2), respectively,
for country j at time t. The first-order conditions are
∂£A
∂pii,0
= 2
(
J∑
j=1
pjpij,0
)
pi + κi,0 = 0, i = 1, ..., J (10)
∂£A
∂yi,0
= 2α
(
J∑
j=1
pjyj,0
)
pi − λiκi,0 + υi,0 = 0, i = 1, ..., J (11)
∂£A
∂R0
= 2θR0 +
J∑
j=1
ϕjυj,0 = 0 (12)
and solving this system for R0 yields
RA0 =
1
θ
J∑
i=1
piϕiλi
J∑
j=1
pjpij,0 +
α
θ
J∑
i=1
piϕi
J∑
j=1
pjyj,0 (13)
as the optimal policy.
When the union’s objective is in terms of the average of country-level
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welfare (8), the Lagrangian is
£B =
∞∑
t=0
J∑
j=1
pjβ
t
j
(
pi2j,t + αjy
2
j,t + θjR
2
t
)
−
∞∑
t=0
J∑
j=1
κj,t
(
βjEtpij,t+1 + λjyj,t + uj,t − pij,t
)
(14)
−
∞∑
t=0
J∑
j=1
υj,t
(−ϕj (Rt − Etpij,t+1) + Etyj,t+1 + nj,t − yj,t)
and the first-order conditions are
∂£B
∂pii,0
= 2pipii,0 + κi,0 = 0, i = 1, ..., J (15)
∂£B
∂yi,0
= 2piαiyi,0 − λiκi,0 + υi,0 = 0, i = 1, ..., J (16)
∂£B
∂R0
= 2R0
J∑
j=1
pjθj +
J∑
j=1
υj,0ϕj = 0 (17)
which yield
RB0 =
(
J∑
j=1
pjθj
)−1
J∑
j=1
pjϕj (λjpij,0 + αjyj,0) (18)
as the optimal discretionary policy.
Both the policy that minimizes the objective in terms of union aggregates
(13) and the one that minimizes the average of the country-level objectives
(18), respond to increases in output and inflation in a member country by
raising the nominal interest rate. The two policies do, however, differ in how
much the interest rate responds to conditions in each individual country.
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With the policy based on union aggregates (13) we have
∂RA0
∂pik,0
∂RA0
∂pil,0
=
∂RA0
∂yk,0
∂RA0
∂yl,0
=
pk
pl
, k, l = 1, ..., J (19)
for any two countries k and l, while we have
∂RB0
∂pik,0
∂RB
∂pil,0
=
pkϕkλk
plϕlλl
, k, l = 1, ..., J (20)
∂RB0
∂yk,0
∂RB0
∂yl,0
=
pkϕkαk
plϕlαl
, k, l = 1, ..., J (21)
with the policy based on averaging member objectives (18). These ratios
measure the relative weight carried by country k relative to country l in
determining the policy instrument R0. As expected, country k carries a
smaller weight the lower pk is, but in addition, when the economies are not
identical (ϕkαk 6= ϕlαl or ϕkλk 6= ϕlλl), the two policies effectively weight
economic conditions in the two countries differently, even if the weights pk
and pl are the same for both policies. The reason for this is that the policy
objective (3) is a quadratic function, so it matters how one aggregates.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) show that the more open country j is,
that is, the more it trades with other countries, the larger αj and ϕj , and the
smaller λj . Intuitively, this can be explained as follows. The weight output
carries in the policy objective, measured by αj , is higher because the terms
of trade affect welfare, and since these enter through the output variable in
our simple model, output must receive a larger weight the more open the
10
economy is. The effect a change in the real interest rate has on output,
measured by ϕj , is larger the more an economy trades because a change in
this rate affects the terms of trade, making the resulting movement in output
larger. An increase in the real interest rate deteriorates the terms of trade,
and therefore makes output decrease more the more open the economy is.
The reason for a smaller λj is to adjust for net exports. The more open
an economy is, the less domestic inflation is generated by supply increases,
because a larger fraction of the goods are imported.
Furthermore, one can use Clarida, Gali and Gertler’s (2001) framework
to show that ϕjαj and ϕjλj will be larger the more open an economy is.
The first is trivial, since we argued in the previous paragraph that both ϕj
and αj will be larger the higher the degree of openness. For the second, we
have from Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) that
ϕjλj = δj
(
1 +
1 + γj
(
σjηj − 1
) (
2− γj
)
σj
φj
)
(22)
where δj measures the sensitivity of domestic inflation to changes in the
marginal costs of production in country j, σj is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion in country j, ηj is the elasticity of substitution between domestically
and foreign produced goods in country j, φj is the inverse of the labor supply
elasticity in country j, and γj ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of goods consumed
in country j that are of foreign production, a measure of the country’s
openness. Empirically, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) argue, σjηj > 1 is
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generally satisfied, making
∂ϕjλj
∂γj
= 2δj
(
σjηj − 1
) (
1− γj
) φj
σj
(23)
strictly positive.3
Since ϕjαj and ϕjλj will, ceteris paribus, be larger the more open the
economy of country j is, union countries with a high degree of openness will
receive a lower effective weight in policymaking with an objective in terms of
union aggregates (4) than with one in terms of the average of country-level
objectives (8). For example, estimates of λj , the degree of price-stickiness
in country j, by Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) for Germany, France,
Italy, Spain and the Netherlands vary from .001 to .142 across the different
countries. This implies that the relative weight put on a country’s rate of
inflation, which is arguably the main focus of the ECB, can vary by more
than a factor of one hundred between the policy that minimizes the objective
in terms of union aggregates (19) and the one that minimizes the average of
country-level objectives (20).
Table 1 provides measures of the degree of economic openness in the
European Monetary Union (EMU), illustrating the great disparities that
exist across members, especially toward countries outside the EMU.4 Bel-
3The degree of openness is not the only way in which union countries can differ that
would impact the effective weights in policymaking through αj , λj and ϕj . However, it is
one of the more obvious and easily measured differences.
4Luxembourg, Monaco, San Marino, the Vatican City, Cyprus, Malta and Estonia were
excluded from table 1, but the sum of their weights in policymaking is less than 1%. Trade
statistics are averages for 1999-2009, except non-EMU trade numbers for Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Slovenia, which start in 2003, 2002, 2006 and 2005, respectively. All data
for Greece is provisional. The statistics for HICP-inflation were computed over the period
the country was a member of the EMU, including the weight, which is an average over
those years
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All Non-EMU HICP-Inflation
Imp Exp Imp Exp Mean Var Weight
Austria 47.4 51.2 7.2 9.4 1.75 .82 3.1
Belgium 73.7 77.5 10.4 11.4 2.05 1.73 3.5
Finland 35.5 41.8 1.94 .99 1.6
France 26.7 26.7 3.4 4.2 1.70 .84 20.6
Germany 35.1 39.3 6.7 8.1 1.53 .73 29.6
Greece 34.9 22.6 4.3 4.6 3.28 .87 2.9
Ireland 74.2 87.5 21.1 21.2 2.96 3.70 1.3
Italy 25.8 26.2 2.9 3.9 2.26 .58 18.8
Netherlands 61.8 68.7 8.6 11.8 2.35 1.58 5.2
Portugal 37.9 29.0 3.2 4.4 2.57 2.11 2.1
Slovakia 78.9 75.2 15.1 16.0 2.00 3.10 .7
Slovenia 60.0 58.9 7.9 9.6 3.25 4.72 .4
Spain 30.5 26.6 3.5 4.7 2.89 1.71 11.2
EMU 2.00 .72 100
Table 1: Imports and exports as fractions of GDP and HICP-inflation statis-
tics for EMU members, all in percentages, 1999-2009. Eurostat.
gium, Ireland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Netherlands are the most open,
while France, Greece, Italy and Spain are the least open. In addition, the
table provides summary statistics for HICP-inflation, including the weight
each country carries in aggregation, all computed over the years each has
been a member of the EMU.5 Inflation experiences have also varied across
countries, both in level and volatility. For example, Greece has experienced
an average rate two times greater than that of Germany, while Ireland has
experienced a variance six times greater than that of Italy. As one would
expect, the countries with the largest weights in policymaking, Germany,
France and Italy, are among the ones that have enjoyed the lowest and most
5More precisely, the data for each country goes back to whenever its previous national
currency became officially pegged to the Euro, which was January 1999 for all countries
except: June 2000 for Greece, July 2006 for Slovenia and July 2008 for Slovakia.
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stable inflation.
With a policy objective in terms of country-level aggregates, the more
open economies, Belgium, Ireland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Netherlands,
would have received a larger weight in policymaking than with the current
objective based on union aggregates. With the exception of Portugal and
Spain, these are also the countries that have experienced the most inflation
volatility. France, Greece, Italy and Spain would have received a lower
weight, and with the exception of Spain, these are also among those to have
experienced the least inflation volatility.
Conclusions
Assuming that the average of country-level welfare more closely measures
overall union welfare than the welfare of the average union member when
countries are asymmetric, we find that using union aggregates to formu-
late the union’s policy objectives makes the countries with the more open
economies receive too little weight. While this result is specific to our model,
it is useful in illustrating the more general point that when union members
are asymmetric, it can make a difference whether the policy objective is in
terms of union aggregates or an average of country-level objectives. This
choice can affect the effective weight each union member carries in poli-
cymaking, and thus how fluctuation costs are distributed among them. An
exact evaluation of the welfare implications in each country from policymak-
ers focusing on one policy objective versus the other would require specifying
the parameter values, initial conditions and shocks for all countries, and is
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beyond the scope of the present study. Besides, such an exercise would
require a more complete and detailed model in order to yield realistic esti-
mates. However, it seems reasonable to infer that having a smaller impact
on union policy will generally make a country worse off, when the union
members’ economies, and the shocks affecting these, are asymmetric. Intu-
itively, it is also clear that focusing on an average of country-level objectives
would make monetary policy contribute toward making these variables more
homogeneous across union members, thus helping to synchronize their busi-
ness cycles. The reason is that such an objective punishes heterogeneity,
while an objective in terms of union aggregates does not.
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